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I. Introduction
The House of Representatives is currently considering a bill, H.R. 1632,
which if enacted will provide a comprehensive domestic system of liability
and compensation for oil spill damage and removal costs. One of the most
important and controversial provisions in the legislation calls for the even-
tual replacement of federal and state oil pollution regimes with the 1984
Protocols to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pol-
lution Damage (CLC) and the International Convention on the Establish-
ment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
(Fund). Both Protocols revise and update the international system of
liability and compensation for damage caused by vessel source oil pollution.
Prompt action by the Congress in this area is needed. Under existing
federal law, at least five statutes deal with the issue of oil spill liability
and compensation. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended,
provides recovery for government clean-up costs and damages, but does
not address recovery for damaged third parties. Three separate statutes,
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, the Deepwater Port Act,
and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, address oil pollution liability
and compensation only within the limited territorial scope of their pro-
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visions. Overall, these statutes fail to address comprehensively or uni-
formly the issues of liability and compensation stemming from maritime
oil pollution.
Unfortunately gaps in recent legislation remain and are filled by con-
tinued application of the Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act of 1851.
The recent decision in the Amoco Cadiz, finding the defendants liable
without limitation, required the court to reinterpret, and arguably mis-
interpret, legal terms employed in the applicable 1851 statute. Forcing
courts to remake United States policy by reference to a 137-year-old
statute has contributed to the present state of uncertainty in determining
liability and recovery under U.S. law. This confusion is exacerbated by
the existence of myriad state statutes providing different systems of
recovery.
This article begins with an examination of the current international
regime of civil liability for oil pollution, along with the revisions contem-
plated by the 1984 Protocols. Discussion of the domestic legal system, an
inconsistent mix of federal and state statutes, follows. The need to update
United States law is further illustrated by a brief examination of the recent
decision in the Amoco Cadiz. The current bill before the House of Rep-
resentatives, H.R. 1632, is then analyzed. This article concludes that the
best interests of the United States are served by ratifying the 1984 CLC
Protocol and the 1984 Fund Protocol. The total recovery available under
the CLC and Fund Protocols remains substantially higher than that avail-
able under existing federal and state statutes. Finally, ratification and
implementation of the Protocols by the United States would encourage
other countries to ratify, resulting in much needed uniform worldwide
standards of civil liability for maritime oil pollution damages.
II. International Conventions
In 1969 an international conference, sponsored by the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (now the International Mar-
itime Organization (IMO)), adopted two conventions addressing the
problem of marine oil pollution: the International Convention Relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (In-
tervention Convention) and the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC). 2 The impetus for these conventions was the
I. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, 970 U.N.T.S. 211.
2. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,
973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970) [hereinafter CLC].
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wreck of the Torrey Canyon in May 1967. 3 The Torrey Canyon spilled
100,000 tons of crude oil into the English Channel, causing extensive
damage to both the English and French coastlines. 4 The inadequacy of
existing domestic and international legal principles relating to marine oil
pollution casualties was exposed by the ensuing difficulties in resolving
the numerous compensation claims and liability issues raised by various
claimants in that case. 5
The Intervention Convention addresses the rights of coastal states to
take defensive measures when a maritime casualty outside of its territorial
waters threatens oil pollution damage to the state. 6 The CLC was designed
to "adopt uniform international rules and procedures for determining
questions of liability and providing adequate compensation" for vessel
source oil pollution. 7 The CLC came into force in December 1975, and
has been ratified by fifty-seven countries. 8 Under the CLC, a shipowner
is strictly liable for damage to the territory of a contracting state (including
its territorial sea) caused by oil that escapes or is discharged from its
ship. 9 Compensable pollution damage includes both governmental clean-
up costs and damages to private interests, such as economic loss and
property damage to
A shipowner can avoid strict liability by establishing that the pollution
damage (1) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection,
or natural phenomenon of any exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible
character; (2) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent
3. See Gunn, Limitation of Liability: United States and Convention Jurisdictions. 8 MAR.
LAW. 29, 59 (1983); see also Rosenthal & Raper, Amoco Cadiz and Limitation of Liability
for Oil Spill Pollution: Domestic and International Solutions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES
LAW 259, 276-80 (1985).
4. IMCO NEWS 12 (1979).
5. Suits brought in the United States were decided under the Limitation of Liability Act
of 1851. See In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). International
agreements in place at the time of the Torrey Canyon were considered inadequate. The 1954
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) opened
for signature May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, addressed
only the deliberate discharge of oil by ocean vessels, not oil pollution caused by maritime
accidents. See Gunn, supra note 3, at 58. In addition the compensation provided by the
1957 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of
Seagoing Ships (the Brussels Convention), reprinted in 1957 A.M.C. 1972, was viewed as
totally insufficient. For a discussion of the particular legal issues raised by the Torrey Canyon
oil spill, see Rosenthal & Raper, supra note 3, at 277-78.
6. Intervention Convention, supra note I, art. I(I). Britain had bombed the Torrey Canyon
in an attempt to minimize pollution damage. The legality of this and other types of defensive
measures by coastal states is addressed in the Intervention Convention.
7. CLC supra note 2, preamble.
8. For a list of contracting states, see Appendix.
9. CLC supra note 2, art. 111(I), art. II.
10. Id. art. 1(6). Pollution damage is defined to include the costs of reasonable preventative
measures and loss or damage caused by the preventative measures taken. Id. art. 1(6), (7).
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to cause damage by a third party; or (3) was wholly caused by the neg-
ligence or other wrongful act of a government or authority responsible
for the maintenance of navigational aids. I I Recovery will also be denied
to the extent that the shipowner can prove that the damage resulted from
the claimant's own negligence or intent to cause damage. 12
A shipowner can limit its liability under the CLC by posting a limitation
fund. 13 The maximum liability is 133 Standard Drawing Rights (SDRs)
(approximately U.S. $180) 14 per ton of the vessel's tonnage, with a max-
imum liability of 14 million SDRs (approximately U.S. $18.9 million) per
incident. 15 The amounts contributed to the limitation fund are distributed
among the claimants in proportion to the amounts of their accepted
claims. 16 Owners of ships carrying over 2000 tons of oil must obtain
insurance or other financial security for the amount of potential liability
under the Convention. 17 If the incident occurred as a result of the actual
fault or privity of the shipowner, liability is unlimited. 18
The CLC was designed to be the exclusive source of recovery for
pollution damages against the shipowner. 19 The Convention also grants
the shipowner's "servants or agents" immunity from all claims. 20
Even in 1969, the amounts provided for under the CLC were considered
inadequate. 2 1 At the time the CLC was signed, the drafters also agreed
II. Id. art. 111(2)(a)-(c).
12. Id. art. 111(3).
13. Id. art. V(3).
14. Id. art. V(I). Monetary amounts were originally measured in the Poincard franc,
which is equal to 65.5 mg of gold at 900/1000e. The dollar equivalents expressed in this
article are based on the Special Drawing Right (SDR) and are converted to United States
dollars at the conversion rate of I SDR = $US 1.3528. Source: J. MAR. L. & COMM., Feb.
10, 1988, at 7A, col. 6. Abandonment of the gold standard led to IMCO adoption of Protocols
to the CLC and Fund, which alter the unit of account from the Poincard franc to the Special
Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary Fund. The Protocol revised the
CLC amounts of 2000 francs and 210 millions francs to 133 SDRs and 14 million SDRs
respectively. Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, Nov. 19, 1976, reprinted in 16 1. L.M. 621 (1977). The Protocol to convert the Fund
units of account on the basis of 15 francs equals I SDR was adopted by IMCO at the same
time. Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, reprinted in 16 I.M.F. 621 (1977). SDR
conversions used in this article are approximate since the conversion rates can vary day to
day.
15. CLC supra note 2, art. V(I). The vessel's tonnage is the "net tonnage of the ship
with the addition of the amount deducted from the gross tonnage on account of engine room
space for the purpose of ascertaining the net tonnage." Id. art. V(10).
16. Id. art. V(4).
17. Id. art. VII.
18. Id. art. V(2).
19. Article 111(4) states that "No claim for compensation for pollution damage shall be
made against the owner otherwise than in accordance with this Convention." Id.
20. Id.
21. In 1969, the official value of 2000 francs was approximately $134.
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to create an international fund to supplement the amounts available under
the Convention. 22
Two years of negotiations resulted in the International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage (the Fund)23 which provides compensation in cases
where oil pollution damages exceed those compensable under the CLC. 24
Thirty-four states have ratified the Fund, which entered into force in
October 1978.25 The Fund raises the total amount of compensation avail-
able under the two conventions to 45 million SDRs (approximately U.S.
$60.9 million) by allocation of the compensation burden between ship-
owners and cargo interests. 26 Mandatory contributions from oil compa-
nies that receive more than 150,000 tons of oil per year finance the Fund. 27
The Fund provides compensation for some victims denied a remedy under
the CLC28 and will indemnify shipowners for part of their expenditures
under the CLC. 29 Membership in the CLC is a prerequisite to joining the
Fund. 30
Although the United States signed both conventions, it has yet to ratify
either. The United States contends that the recovery available under the
two Conventions is too low.3 1 The CLC and Fund Protocols, adopted by
22. See R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACKER, POLLUTION, POLITICS. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
TANKERS AT SEA 173 (1979).
23. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Com-
pensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18. 1971, reprinted in I I I.L.M. 284 (1972) [here-
inafter Fund].
24. Id. art. IV(l).
25. Thus, twenty-three states that are CLC parties have not ratified the Fund. For a list
of countries that have ratified the Fund, see Appendix.
26. Fund supra note 23, art. IV(6). The Article IV limit is set at a figure between 450
million and 900 million francs. (450 million francs = 30 SDRs; 900 million francs = 60
million SDRs). Prospective changes in the limit require a three-fourths vote of the Fund
members, present and voting. Id. arts. XXXII(c), XXXIII(l)(a). The limit was increased
from 450 million to 675 million francs effective April 20, 1979 (675 million francs = 45
million SDRs); see supra note 14.
27. Id. art. The Fund permits governments to collect the appropriate levy and make the
contributions to the Fund itself. Id. art. XIV(). The contributions of oil receivers are based
on an amount per ton on the quantity of oil they receive annually from member nations.
Id. art. XXII.
28. For example, the Fund pays claims when pollution results from a natural phenomenon,
act of a third person, or faulty government maintenance of navigational aids, since these
occurrences are not included as exceptions as they are in the CLC. Id. art. IV.
29. Id. art. V(I). Indemnification is not available if the shipowner is found guilty of
intentional misconduct. Id.
30. Id. art. XXXVII(4).
31. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 518 (1977).
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the IM0 32 in May 1984, seek to address concerns about the liability limits
and other perceived inadequacies of the 1969 CLC and Fund.
The United States actively participated in the negotiations leading to
the 1984 Protocols, and the effect of its tremendous influence in the pro-
ceedings is evident in many of the agreements' provisions. 33 The CLC
Protocol substantially raises the liability limits. The limits, expressed in
IMF "units of account, ' 34 were raised to 3 million units of account (ap-
proximately U.S. $4.06 million) for vessels up to 5000 gross tons, with
an additional 420 units of account (approximately U.S. $568) liability for
each additional ton. 35 Maximum liability under the CLC Protocol is 59.7
million units of account (approximately U.S. $80.8 million). 36 The ship-
owner's liability will be unlimited if it is shown that the damage resulted
from the shipowner's personal act done intentionally or recklessly.
3 7
Strict liability continues under the CLC Protocol, and all defenses to
strict liability are also retained. The types of damages recoverable under
the CLC Protocol also remain the same, with some clarifications. 38 For
example, the definition of compensable "impairment to the environment"
is clarified to allow recovery of only the costs of reasonable reinstatement
actually undertaken or to be undertaken. 39 The territorial scope of the
CLC was expanded to cover damages sustained in the exclusive economic
zone of any contracting state. 40
32. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1969, reprinted in 15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 613-22 (1984) [hereinafter CLC
Protocol]; Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, reprinted in
15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 623-33 (1984) [hereinafter Fund Protocol].
33. It was decided that states not party to the original conventions would be allowed to
participate in the formation of the Protocols. See Technical Report of the Department of
State 5 (Oct. 7, 1985), S. TREATY Doc. No. 12, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) [hereinafter
Technical Report].
34. The unit of account is the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the International
Monetary Fund. See supra note 14. Any decline in the dollar, relative to other SDR-basket
currencies (British pound, French franc, West German mark and Japanese yen) will increase
the dollar value of the SDR.
35. CLC Protocol, supra note 32, art. VI.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. VI(2).
38. The Department of State has proposed an attachment to the United States Instruments
of Ratification that would contain the United States understanding of the scope of com-
pensable damages under Article 1. This attachment would (I) disallow compensation as-
sessed on the basis of abstract quantifications of damages, (2) would require a demonstrated
intenition to carry out measures of reinstatement, and (3) would limit reimbursement o"'costs
of preventative measures. See Technical Report, supra note 33, at 26-27.
39. CLC Protocol, supra note 32, art. 11(3).
40. Id. art. Ill.
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The CLC Protocol also enlarges the classes of parties protected from
liability. The 1969 CLC expressly excluded only "servants and agents"
of the shipowner from claims for compensation. 4 1 Article IV of the CLC
Protocol expressly enumerates additional parties who cannot be subject
to a claim for compensation:
(a) servants or agents of the owner or members of the crew;
(b) the pilot or any other person who, .... performs services for the
ship;
(c) any charterer, .... manager or operator of the ship;
(d) any person performing salvage operations ...
(e) any person taking preventive measures.. 42
However, this exemption may not apply if it can be shown that the
damages resulted from a "personal act or omission, committed with the
intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such
damage would probably result" by any of the persons named in Article
IV.4 3
The 1984 Fund Protocol raises the maximum level of compensation
available under the two Protocols to 135 million units of account (ap-
proximately U.S. $182.6 million) per incident. 44 This limit will be auto-
matically increased to 200 million units of account (approximately U.S.
$270.5 million) with respect to any period when there are three states
party whose combined annual oil receipts equal or exceed 600 million
tons.
4 5
The CLC Protocol will enter into force for those who have ratified or
acceded to it twelve months following the date on which ten states, in-
cluding six each with not less than one million units of gross tanker
tonnage, have become parties to it.4 6 The Fund will enter into force after
at least eight states whose total receipt of oil during the preceding year
is at least six hundred million tons of contributing oil ratify or accede to
the Convention. 4 7
The increased liability limits under the CLC and Fund Protocols are
widely considered sufficient to compensate all legitimate claimants with
41. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
42. CLC Protocol, supra note 32, art. IV. Servants and agents of the enumerated parties
are also exempted. Id.
43. Id.
44. Fund Protocol, supra note 32, art. IV(3).
45. Id. art. VI. United States ratification would supply approximately 450 million tons
of this required yearly tonnage and would virtually ensure this increased coverage.
46. CLC Protocol, supra note 32, art. XIII.
47. Fund Protocol, supra note 32, art. XXX. For an analysis of the application of the
original Conventions and the Protocols during the transitional period, see D. ABECASSIS &
R. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPs 246-51, 288-93 (1985).
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regard to any oil spill likely to occur in U.S. waters. 48 These limits are
substantially greater than those currently available under existing do-
mestic statutes. In addition, the regime of liability established under the
Protocols would be a great improvement over the antiquated and piece-
meal procedures for recovery under U.S. law. The next section sets out
the current regime for recovery of oil pollution under U.S. law.
III. United States Legislation
While the United States participated in the international conferences
leading up to the adoption of the 1969 CLC and Fund, and signed both,
it has never ratified them, primarily because the liability limits were deemed-
to be too low. Instead, Congress sought, in the wake of the Torrey Canyon
disaster and subsequently, to address the issues of liability and compen-
sation for vessel oil pollution through a series of domestic statutes. 4 9 The
first attempt was the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,50 which
was subsequently amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 197251 and the Clean Water Act of 1977.52 Other federal
responses to oil pollution damages, relating to discrete maritime projects,
include the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, 53 the Deep-
water Port Act of 1974, 54 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments. 55 All of these statutes impose separate liability limits, apply
different definitions of culpable parties and qualifying claimants, and es-
tablish separate funds for compensation. In addition, despite enactment
of these recent statutes, a much earlier federal law relating to maritime
accident liability and compensation, the Shipowner's Limitation of Lia-
bility Act of 1851,56 still has application to damage claims arising from
oil spills. The salient features of each of these statutes are discussed briefly
below.
48. See President Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal to the Senate, Nov. 5, 1985, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 12, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985). [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal]
49. Numerous articles provide detailed analysis of United States legislation. See, e.g.,
Mendelson & Fidell. Liability for Oil Pollution-United States Law, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM.
475 (1979); Milstein, Enforcing International Law: United States Agencies and the Regu-
lation of Oil Pollution in American Waters, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 273 (1975).
50. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) (superseded
1972).
51. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
52. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982)).
53. Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1976)).
54. Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976)).
55. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (codified at 43 U.S. C. §§ 1801-1866 (Supp. 11 1978)).
56. Ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (1982)).
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A. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
In 1970, Congress enacted the Water Quality Improvement Act
(WQIA). 57 This Act imposed strict liability on the owner of the vessel
for the costs incurred by the federal government in cleaning up oil spills
in the navigable waters of the United States. 58 Each vessel owner or
responsible operator was required to reimburse the government for clean-
up costs in amounts of $100 per gross registered ton of the vessel, with
a maximum liability of $14 million. 59 The WQIA covered federal govern-
ment clean-up costs only. The Act did not address recovery of government
or third-party economic or property damages. A $35 million revolving
fund, financed by congressional appropriations, was established to assist
the government's clean-up efforts.60 The vessel owner or responsible
operator could avoid liability under the WQIA by proving that the spill
was the result of (I) an act of God, (2) an act of war, (3) negligence on
the part of the United States Government, or (4) any act or omission of
a third party.61
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(FWPCA) 62 added hazardous substances to the regulatory regime estab-
lished for oil spills under the WQIA. 63 Although the FWPCA technically
repealed the WQIA, all of WQIA's substantive provisions concerning oil
pollution were adopted unchanged in the new statute. 64 The FWPCA
applied only to governmental costs associated with clean up and removal
of oil, with the same liability limits established by the WQIA.
The FWPCA, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, remains in
force today.65 The 1977 amendments increased the liability limits on sea-
going vessels from $100 per gross registered ton to $150 per gross regis-
tered ton and removed the $14 million ceiling on liability.66 The FWPCA
does not provide for the recovery of damages by private persons and does
57. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) (superseded
1972).
58. 84 Stat. at 94, 97 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1982)).
59. Id.
60. 84 Stat. at 96 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k) (1982).
61. 84 Stat. at 94 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1982)).
62. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976). For an explanation of the provisions concerning hazardous
substances, see Wallace & Ratcliffe, Water Pollution Laws: Can They Be Cleaned Up?, 57
TUL. L. REV. 1343, 1345-46 (1983).
64. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
65. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376
(1982)).
66. Id. § 1321(f)(1) (1982). Instead, a minimum liability of $250,000 for clean-up costs
was introduced.
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not preempt state statutes concerning oil pollution compensation and
liability.67
B. TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE AUTHORIZATION ACT
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPPA), enacted in 1973,
covers damages caused by vessels operating between the pipeline ter-
minals and United States ports. 68 Vessel owners or operators are strictly
liable for "all damages, including clean-up costs, sustained by any person
or entity, public or private, . . . as the result of discharges of oil" from
vessels. 69 The two defenses available to exonerate the vessel owner are
(1) an act of war or (2) negligence of the United States Government. 70
The liability of a vessel owner is limited to $14 million, and the Act requires
proof of financial responsibility for that amount before pipeline oil can be
loaded on the vessel. 7 1
The Act also created the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Fund, financed by a
five cents per barrel tax on all oil passing through the Trans-Alaska pipe-
line. 72 The Pipeline Fund compensates the government or private parties
in circumstances where proved damages exceed the $14 million maximum
liability of the vessel owner.73 The Pipeline Fund remains subject to an
overall limit of $100 million per incident. 74 Uncompensated claims may
be asserted under the applicable federal or state laws, which are not
preempted.75
C. DEEPWATER PORT ACT
The Deepwater Port Act (DPA) of 1974 established a federal licensing
and regulatory system for the development of deepwater ports beyond
the United States' three-mile territorial sea. 76 The Act imposes strict
liability for clean-up costs and damages that result from a discharge of
67. Id. § 1321(o)(2) (1982). For a discussion of the state legislation in this area, see infra
notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
68. Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1976)).
69. Id. § 1653(c)(I). Pipeline right-of-way holders are also strictly liable to all damaged
parties, subject to the same defenses available to shipowners, for damages resulting from
activities along such right of way. Id. § 1653(a)(1).
70. Id. § 1653(c)(2).
71. Id. § 1653(c)(3).
72. Id. § 1653(c)(4)(5).
73. Id. § 1653(c)(3).
74. Id. § 1653(c)(5). The Act provides that the five-cent tax will be collected until the
Fund realizes $100 million, and thereafter as needed to maintain that level. Id.
75. Id. § 1653(c)(9).
76. Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976)). The
laden draft of modern oil tankers far exceeds the depth of most U.S. ports.
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oil from any of the facilities of the port or from any vessel proceeding to
or from the deepwater port.77 The deepwater port licensee's liability is
limited to $50 million and the vessel owner's limitation is $150 per gross
registered ton up to a maximum of $20 million. 78 The defenses of act of
war or negligence on the part of the United States Government are avail-
able to the vessel owner or licensee. 79 Liability will be unlimited if it can
be proven that the discharge resulted from gross negligence or willful
misconduct within the privity or knowledge of the vessel owner or
licensee. 80
Damages in excess of the maximum liability of the vessel owner and
licensee can be recovered from a compensation fund established by the
Act. 81 The compensation fund, to be supported by a levy on vessel owners
of two cents per barrel of oil loaded or unloaded at a deepwater port, is
available to cover damages up to $100 million. 82
The DPA provides damaged third parties with alternative procedures
of seeking recovery. The Act authorizes the Attorney General of the
United States to maintain a class action "on behalf of any group of dam-
aged citizens he determines would be more adequately represented as a
class in recovery of claims." 83 In addition, the Secretary of Transpor-
tation, acting "as trustee of the natural resources of the marine environ-
ment," is authorized to sue and recover for damages to such resources. 84
Damaged parties may also seek recovery under applicable state statutes,
which were not preempted under the Act. 85
D. OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT AMENDMENTS
In 1978, the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) was
amended to deal with the increased risk of damage to the marine and
coastal environments caused by expanded development of oil and gas
resources on the Outer Continental Shelf.86 The amendments apply to
77. Id. § 1517(d).
78. Id. § 1517(d), (e).
79. Id. § 1517(g).
80. Id. § 1517(d), (e).
81. Id. § 1517(f). Collection of the fee was suspended under the Deepwater Port Act
Amendments, but can be reinstated by the Secretary of Transportation under certain cir-
cumstances. See Pub. L. No. 98-419 (1984).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(f)(3).
83. Id. § 1517(i)(1).
84. Id. § 1517(i)(3). These sums are to be applied "to the restoration and rehabilitation
of such natural resources." Id.
85. Id. § 1517(k)(I).
86. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1866 (Supp. 11 1978)).
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owners and operators of any offshore facility on the Outer Continental
Shelf and vessels operating in superadjacent waters and carrying oil from
the facilities. 8
7
Liability to third parties for damages, other than clean-up or removal
costs, is strict but limited. The offshore facility owner is liable up to $35
million and the vessel owner is liable in the amount of $300 per gross
registered ton, with no upper limit. 88 Certain defenses to liability are
available to the vessel and facility owners. 89 Nevertheless, willful mis-
conduct or gross negligence within the privity of knowledge of the owner
or operator of the offending vessel will void the liability limitations under
the Act. 90
Vessel or facility owners are liable without limit for all costs of removal
incurred by the Federal Government or any state or local government
agency.9 1 No defenses exist to this absolute liability.9 2
The OCSLA Amendments also create an Offshore Pollution Compen-
sation Fund of an amount limited to $200 million to cover losses "not
otherwise compensated. ' 93 The OCSLA Fund is financed by a fee of
three cents per barrel levied on the owner of oil extracted from the Outer
Continental Shelf.9 4 The Attorney General may file class action suits in
a manner similar to that provided in the DPA.9 5 Finally, following the
precedent set by the FWPCA, TAPPA, and DPA, state laws providing for
compensation are not preempted by OCSLA. 96
E. THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT OF 1851
This 136-year-old statute, designed to protect the American maritime
industry and grant parity with other maritime nations, accomplishes its
87. Id. § 1811(5); 1814(a).
88. Id. § 1814(b). The vessel owner's minimum liability is $250,000.
89. The owner or operator is not liable for pollution where the sole cause is (I) an act of
war, hostilities, insurrection, civil war; (2) an unanticipated grave natural disaster; or (3) an
intentional or negligent act of either the damaged party or a third party (including any
governmental entity). Id. § 1814(c).
90. Id. § 1814(b). Liability will also be unlimited if the incident is caused by a violation,
within the privity or knowledge of the owner or operator, of federal safety, construction,
or operating standards or regulations. Id.
91. Id. § 1814(d). Removal costs are defined to include clean-up costs and other costs
incurred under the FWPCA and the Intervention on the High Seas Act. Id. § 1811.
92. Id. § 1814(d).
93. Id. § 1812.
94. Id. § 1812(d)(1). The fund must be maintained at between $100 and $200 million. Id.
§ 1812(d)(2).
95. Id. § 1813(b)(7); see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
96. 43 U.S.C. § 1820(c) (Supp. II 1978).
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purposes by severely limiting shipowners' personal liability.9 7 Section
183(a) states:
The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for
embezzlement, loss or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or
merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage,
or injury by collision, or for any act, matter or damage, or forfeiture done,
occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or
owners, shall not... exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner
in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
9 8
Section 183(a) of the Act allows the shipowner to limit his liability to the
value of his interest in the vessel and the freight pending, 99 in the absence
of his privity or knowledge of the negligence causing the damage. 100 The
first judicial interpretation of the Act's liability provision, in the City of
Norwich, 101 furthered the policy of protecting the shipowner's interests.
The Supreme Court held that the value of the shipowner's interest in the
vessel should be determined by the worth of the vessel after the casualty
occurred. 102 Further, the Court determined that this value would not
include any insurance proceeds that the shipowner might recover. 103 The
inequity that could result from this interpretation is illustrated by the often
cited example of the Torrey Canyon owner's liability if the limitation had
applied-$50, the value of the single lifeboat that remained after the
disaster. 104
Early case law continued to construe the Act in a manner highly pro-
tective of shipowners' interest. 105 The acts within the "privity of knowl-
edge" of the owner, which would vitiate the liability limits, were narrowly
construed. An early reading of the statute, in Lord v. Goodall10 6 reflects
97. Ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (1982)). Although the
statute has been amended from time to time, none of the amendments have relevance to
this discussion. For example, the liability limits for death or personal injury under § 183(b)
were raised from $60 per gross ton of the vessel to $420 per ton in 1984. See Gunn, supra
note 3, at 29-31.
98. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
99. Freight pending has been defined as the amount of gross freight actually earned on
the voyage. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 123-25 (1894).
100. Limitation procedures, contained in § 185 and rule F of the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, enable the shipowner, once he files a petition and
posts security, to compel all claims arising out of the incident to be brought in a single
proceeding. See Staring, Limitation Practice and Procedure, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1134 (1979).
101. The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886).
102. Id. at 491-93.
103. Id. at 493-95.
104. See, e.g., Mendelsohn & Fidell, supra note 49, at 476.
105. For an analysis of this early case law, see Gunn, supra note 3, at 42-46; Rosenthal
& Raper, supra note 3, at 266-72.
106. 15 F. Cas. 884 (No. 8,506) (C.C. Cal. 1877), aff'd, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 451 (1881).
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this narrow construction: "IT]here must be some personal concurrence,
or some fault or negligence on the part of the owner himself, or in which
he personally participates to constitute such privity, within the meaning
of the act, as will exclude him from the benefit of its provisions." 107 Early
judicial interpretation of the "privity of knowledge" provision protected
the owner from the usual consequences of respondeat superior. 108
Recent cases, however, have interpreted the Act as denying the ship-
owner's limitation.10 9 This judicial trend is evidenced by recent holdings
increasing. the scope of activities within the "privity or knowledge" of
the shipowner. The courts have used various methods to reach a more
equitable result such as imputing to corporations knowledge or privity of
lower-level employees, requiring shipowners to exercise an ever-increasing
degree of supervision and inspection, imposing a heavy burden on shi-
powners to prove their lack of privity or knowledge, holding that the
shipowner's duty to ensure the seaworthiness of the ship was nondelega-
ble, and narrowing the group of potential defendants eligible for exon-
eration under the Act.110
Although the courts' zeal to deny limitation is understandable in light
of the minimal recovery flowing from imposition of the limits, many of
these recent decisions arguably misinterpret or ignore the specific lan-
guage and original intent of the statute.III Current United States policy
points clearly in favor of some increased level of recovery to claimants.
Expression of this policy should, however, come from the Congress, not
the courts. In addition, claimants' reliance on a favorable interpretation
of the Act to vitiate the severe liability limitations may, in some cases,
be misplaced. While the majority of recent cases decided under the Act
have resulted in full recovery for claimants, a number of courts have
upheld the limitation.11 2
Gaps in coverage under recent federal legislation relating to oil pollution
liability and compensation leave open the possible application of the 1851
Act to actions for damages from oil spills occurring in United States
navigable waters.11 3 The recent decision in Amoco Cadiz, discussed be-
107. 15 F. Cas. at 887.
108. See Gunn supra note 3, at 41-42.
109. See Rosenthal & Raper, supra note 3, at 266-72.
110. For an extensive analysis of some of these recent cases, see Gunn, supra note 3, at
42-46; Rosenthal & Raper, supra note 3, at 268-74.
111. Id.
112. During the period of 1973-81, limitation was granted in fifteen out of forty-seven
reported cases. See R. GREENMAN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF LIMITATION CASES, OC-
TOBER 1953-DECEMBER 1981 (Mar. L. Ass'n of United States, Doc. No. 640 (1982)).
113. For example, although federal government clean-up costs would be covered by the
FWPCA, third-party damages might be subject to the 1851 Act's limitation in an oil spill
not related to a deepwater port, the Outer Continental Shelf, or the Alaskan pipeline.
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low, illustrated the Act's continued application to oil spills outside of
United States navigable waters when United States defendants are involved.
1. Amoco Cadiz
On March 16, 1978, a Liberian tanker, the Amoco Cadiz, ran aground
in the territorial waters of France, spilling 230,000 tons of crude oil into
the coastal waters off Brittany. 114 The resulting oil slick, eighteen miles
wide and eighty miles long, created havoc in the coastal environment,
with devastating ecological 115 and economic 116 loss. In 1983, multiple
suits arising from the incident were consolidated in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 1 17 The French Gov-
ernment sought recovery of its extensive clean-up costs. Other claimants
included various French administrative departments, numerous munici-
palities, and a number of French individuals, businesses, and associations
(the French claimants). 118 The French claimants sought damages from
"the Amoco Parties," a related group of corporate entities. The registered
owner of the Amoco Cadiz was Amoco Transport Company (Transport),
a Liberian corporation wholly owned through subsidiaries by Standard
Oil Company (Standard). Standard, an Indiana corporation with its prin-
cipal office in Illinois, also owned Amoco International Oil Company
(AIOC), a Delaware corporation also with its principal place of business
in Illinois. 119
114. In re Amoco Cadiz, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2041 (N.D. I1. 1984); N.Y. Times,
Apr. 20, 1984, at B5, col. 2.
115. Over 220,000 tons of vital biomass was reported destroyed. The oil killed or drove
away many fish, mollusks, seabirds, and other animals. See Rosenthal & Raper, supra note
3, at 259-60; N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1984, at A2, col. 4.
116. The various claimants initially sought a total of 2.2 billion in damages. See Business
Insurance, Apr. 30, 1984, at I. Final Cost of Amoco Cadiz, 14 MAR. POLLUTION BULL. 12
(1983).
117. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2041. Jurisdiction was asserted under the Admiralty
Clause of the Constitution as implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1333(l), the Limitation of Liability
Act and rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of
the Federal Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1982); FED. R. Civ.
P. SuPP. R.F., 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1); 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2076.
118. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2041-42. Another claimant was the Petroleum Insurance
Limited (PIL), insurers of the cargo, which became subrogated to the cargo loss claims.
Id.
119. Id. at 2041-42. Suits were also filed against Bugsier Reedevei und Bergungs A.G.,
the German salvage tug company that attempted to assist the Amoco Cadiz. The court
found that the French claimants had failed to show the requisite gross negligence or willful
misconduct by the salvor. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2076. The actions by Transport & AIOC
against Bugsier were stayed, on appeal, pending arbitration under the standard form salvage
agreement. See In Re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16,
1978, 659 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1981). Recovery was also sought against Astilleros Espanoles,
S.A., the Spanish company that designed and constructed the Amoco Cadiz. Default judg-
ments were entered against Astilleros and in favor of the French claimants and in favor of
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The court issued its decision on liability on April 18, 1984, holding
Standard and its two subsidiaries jointly and severally liable without lim-
itation for the damage caused by the accident. 120 The decision on dam-
ages, handed down in January 1988, almost four years later, resulted in
an award to the various French claimants of $85.2 million dollars. 121 The
court's lengthy and complex liability decision deals with a vast array of
legal issues raised by the diversity and sheer numbers of the parties to
the case. Two issues determined by the court have relevance to the dis-
.cussion here: the court's interpretation of the 1969 CLC and subsequent
rejection of its applicability, and the court's application and analysis of
the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. Each of these issues is discussed
briefly below.
a. Application of the CLC
The Amoco parties argued that the CLC and the Fund ratified by both
France and Liberia, but not the United States, should be applied by the
court. 122
The court's choice of law analysis is both inconsistent and vague. In
its conclusions of law, the court stated:
Any damages sustained by the claimants in this case were sustained in French
territorial waters or on the coast of France; the substantive law applicable to
such claims would therefore have been French law if it had proved dfferent
from that of the United States. However, it was not proved different. I
the Amoco parties on their indemnity and contribution claims. See In Re Oil Spill by the
Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 491 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
aff'd, 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 196 (1983). Finally, the court reinstated
the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) as a defendant in the action based upon its possible
liability in approving the design of the supertanker. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2079.
120. 20 Env.'t Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2041.
121. In re Amoco Cadiz No. MDL376 (N.D. I11. Jan. I1, 1988); see N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1988, at Al, Col. 3.
122. Using traditional choice of law criteria, the argument is strong that French law,
including the CLC and the Fund, should have been applied to the claims. Most of the events
and evidence relating to the claims occurred in France. Under classic lex loci delecti, French
law prevails as the law of the state where the tort occurred. See Rosenthal & Raper, supra
note 3, at 285. Early Supreme Court decisions appear to favor application of U.S. limitation
law if the result is lower liability for the shipowner. See, e.g., The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24
(1881); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic), 233 U.S. 718 (1914); Black
Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Roberty Stewart & Sons, Ltd., 336 U.S. 386 (1949). Some com-
mentators see a change in the court's choice of law analysis away from automatic application
of the law of the forum towards a more thorough analysis of contacts. See Gunn, supra
note 3, at 38; Rosenthal & Raper, supra note 3, at 286.
123. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2076 (emphasis added). Later, the court seemingly
concedes differences between the two countries' laws: "Whether AIOC and Standard may
be sued is determined by United States law. The CLC is the law of France and not the
United States; it thus does not apply. Id.
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Had the court applied French law, and the CLC as part of that law, two
significantly different results might have followed. Article IX(l) of the
CLC provides:
Where an incident had caused pollution damage in the territory including the
territorial sea of one or more Contracting States, or preventive measures have
been taken to prevent or minimize pollution damage in such territory including
the territorial sea, actions for compensation may only be brought in the Courts
of any such Contracting State or States. 12 4
Furthermore, the CLC provides the exclusive remedy against the ship-
owner and excludes the shipowner's servants or agents from all claims.
Article 111(4) mandates:
No claim for compensation for pollution damage shall be made against the owner
otherwise than in accordance with this Convention. No claim for pollution
damage under this convention or otherwise may be made against the servants
or agents of the owner. 125
Arguably, application of French law would have required the district court
to dismiss the action in favor of the exclusive jurisdiction of the French
courts under the above-mentioned CLC provisions. 12 6 Even if the court
retained jurisdiction, application of the CLC would have given Transport,
the registered owner, the opportunity to avail itself of the Convention's
liability limits. 127 In addition, both AIOC and Standard might have avoided
any liability if recognized as "servants or agents" under Article Ill.128
The court's refusal to apply French law, including the CLC, is disturbing
on two levels. First, in all likelihood the French claimants' decision to
124. CLC Protocol, supra note 32, art. IX(l) (emphasis added).
125. Id. art. 111(4) (emphasis added).
126. In fact, a strong argument can be made that dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds, independent of CLC mandates, was warranted. Although beyond the scope of this
article, the argument is supported by the facts: all damages were suffered in France; all
evidence relating to the events itself and quantification of the damages are in France;
jurisdiction over all parties was available; and the French legal system was capable of hearing
the case. Although the record in this case is confusing, it appears that the Amoco parties
raised forum non conveniens in at least some of their papers. Sec Gaby Beganton v. Standard
Oil Co., No. 78 CH 2524 (Answer to Complaint).
127. If Article V was applied, Transport's total liability would not have exceeded ap-
proximately 18.9 million; see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
128. Despite the court's refusal to apply the CLC, it goes on to interpret, in dictum, the
relevant provisions of the Convention. The court declared that the CLC would not bar suits
against Standard or AIOC since neither party was the registered owner of the vessel. 20
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2076-77. The court also refused to apply Article Ill, which
prohibits all claims made against servants or agents of the owner. Without citing any specific
authority for its conclusion, the court claimed that the phrase "servants or agents" included
only the master and crew of the vessel. Id. at 2077. In fact, a strong argument can be made
that the CLC drafters intended a broader interpretation. See Rosenthal & Raper, supra note
3, at 289-90). This argument is supported by the subsequent clarifications contained in CLC
Protocol, supra note 32, art. IV. This list of persons exempt from liability would arguably
have encompassed the activities of both AIOC and Standard.
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bring suit in the United States was predicated upon a desire to avoid the
liability limits contained in the CLC. Forum shopping by contracting par-
ties' nationals thwarts the Convention's purpose of providing a uniform
and predictable international system of liability for oil pollution dam-
ages. 129 The court was apparently influenced by United States' opinion
that the liability limits in the 1969 CLC were too low. France, however,
had made the determination that such amounts were sufficient for itself
and its nationals. Arguably, this determination should have been respected
by the court in Amoco Cadiz.
The second circumstance making the court's choice-of-law decision of
questionable wisdom was the lack of a predictable and modern legal re-
gime for determining questions of liability and compensation for oil pol-
lution damages in the United States. After dispensing with the CLC, the
court was left with an anachronistic statute under which liability had to
be determined: the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851.
b. Application of the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851
The court's application of the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 to
determine the liability of the Amoco parties was consistent with recent
judicial decisions against limitation and in favor of full recovery. The court
denied the limitation of the Act and found the Amoco parties jointly and
severally liable for all damages resulting from the oil spill. Although an
extensive analysis of the district court's lengthy and complex decision is
beyond the scope of this article, the major points in the case are worth
mentioning. 130
Of the three corporations comprising the Amoco parties, only Trans-
port, the registered owner of the Amoco Cadiz, was deemed eligible to
petition for limitation under the Act. 13 1 In a ruling that arguably ignores
the realities of corporate structure and ownership, the court refused to
find Standard and AIOC, the "parent corporations," eligible for "owner"
status under the Act. 132
The court ultimately denied even Transport the benefits of the limitation
by holding that Transport had presented no evidence that would tend to
establish its freedom from privity or knowledge of the negligence that
129. The potential for forum shopping in maritime oil pollution cases is great given the
international nature of the oil shipping industry. The parties in the Amoco Cadiz, for example,
include an American oil company, a Bermudan insurer, the French government, a Liberian
tanker, a Spanish shipbuilder, and a German tugboat company. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1984, at BS, col. I.
130. For a critical analysis of the Amoco Cadiz opinion, see Rosenthal & Raper, supra
note 3, at 284-90.
131. See In re Amoco Transport Co., 1979 A.M.C. 1017 (N.D. I1. 1979).
132. Id. The court ruled in this manner despite its later characterization of Transport as
"a mere instrumentality" of Standard. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2078.
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caused the wreck. 133 The court justified this result by expanding the
prerequisites to limitation in a manner similar to other recent decisions.
The court ruled that, as nominal owner of the Amoco Cadiz, Transport
had a nondelegable duty to ensure that the vessel was seaworthy, properly
maintained and repaired, and that the crew was adequately trained. 134
The court held that Transport knew or should have known of the unsea-
worthiness of the vessel caused by the negligent actions of its own and
AICO's employees. 1 35 Imposition of this burden had predictable results:
Transport was found liable without limitation.
Some commentators argue that the ends reached by the court in Amoco
Cadiz justified the means employed. 136 Faced with the all-or-nothing man-
date of the 1851 Act, giving the court a choice of severe limitation or
unlimited liability, the court not surprisingly chose the more equitable
result. Nevertheless, this result required the court to manipulate the terms
of the statute and, in doing so, continued the unfortunate precedent set
in recent cases decided under the 1851 Act. Absent explicit repeal of the
1851 Act by Congress, and the adoption of a comprehensive up-to-date
system of recovery for oil pollution damages, forum shopping by foreign
claimants, as evident in the Amoco Cadiz, can be expected to continue.
Although the CLC's low limitation ceilings would have provided a lower
recovery than that achieved by the court's manipulation of the 1851 stat-
ute, such a result would have been preferable to perpetuation of judicial
legislating in this area of the law.
IV. State Law
Current federal law under FWPCA, TAPPA, DPA, and OCSLA does
not preempt the states from enacting oil pollution laws. 137 State legisla-
tures have promulgated many laws in the area. When such laws are added
to the existing federal statutes covering liability and compensation for oil
pollution, a confusing and inconsistent series of laws and programs emerges.
Nineteen coastal states have enacted legislation addressing oil spill liability
in the absence of comprehensive federal regimes. 138 Each of these statutes
has different definitions of shipowner liability, eligible defenses, recover-
able damages, and procedures. 139 Some states maintain funds by levying
fees against owners of oil, others finance these alternate sources of com-
133. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2078; Rosenthal & Raper, supra note 3, at 285-88.
134. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2078.
135. Id.
136. Rosenthal & Raper, supra note 3, at 291.
137. See supra notes 49-95 and accompanying text.
138. A comparison of various state statutes can be found in Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra
note 64 at 1351-54.
139. Id.
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pensation through penalties and legislative appropriations. 140 The states'
action resulted in a group of ad hoc laws providing little guidance to owners
of oil tankers seeking to assess their risks, and providing victims of oil
spills no assured remedy.
The disarray in this area of the law serves no one's interests. Enacting
a comprehensive federal regime for oil pollution liability and compensation
would seem to be the best way to eliminate this confusion. A discussion
of recent attempts in Congress to enact such legislation follows.
V. H.R. 1632
The past seven Congresses have attempted to enact legislation to pro-
vide a comprehensive system of liability and compensation for damages
caused by oil pollution. Existing legislation, discussed above, falls far
short of establishing a unified federal system of recovery. The FWPCA
only provides recovery to the government for clean-up costs and damages.
The DPA, TAPPA, and OCSLA provide relief only for oil spills occurring
within their various territorial jurisdictions. Finally, the 1851 Limitation
of Liability Act represents a complete bar to recovery in the absence of
judicial rewriting of its severe limitation provisions.
H.R. 1632, entitled the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act
of 1987,141 would create a single federal law providing liability, compen-
sation, clean-up authority, and penalties for oil pollution damages. The
system of liability established by the House bill would replace all existing
causes of action for oil pollution damages under federal law. 142
Under H.R. 1632, the responsible party 14 3 becomes jointly, severally,
and strictly liable for the removal costs and damages when that party
causes a discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil into United
States waters. 144
The limits on liability established by the House bill in section 102(c)
are:
140. Id.
141. Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1987, H.R. 1632, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1987).
142. Id. § 109.
143. Responsible party, in the case of a vessel, is defined as any person owning, operating,
or chartering by demise, the vessel. Id. § 102(a)(4)(A).
144. Id. § 102(a)(1). The removal costs and damages recoverable include: (I) removal
costs consistent with the national contingency plan; (2) damage for injury to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources; (3) damages for economic loss resulting from injury to real
or personal property or natural resources; (4) loss of subsistence use of natural resources;
(5) loss of taxes, royalties, rents, or net profits of the Federal Government or any State or
political subdivision thereof for a period not to exceed one year; and (6) some loss of profits
or impairment of earning capacity due to injury or destruction of real or personal property
or natural resources. Id. § 102(a)(2)(A)-(C).
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* $500 per gross ton or $5,000,000, whichever is greater (but not to
exceed $60,000,000), for any tanker carrying oil in bulk or in com-
mercial quantities as cargo;
* $300 per gross ton or $500,000, whichever is greater for any other
vessel; or
* $75,000,000 for any facility. 145
Proof of insurance, surety bond, guarantee, letter of credit, or other evi-
dence of financial responsibility for these amounts is required. 146 The
limits will not be available if the discharge of oil was proximately caused
by willful misconduct or gross negligence within the privity or knowledge
of the responsible party. 147
A "responsible party" can completely avoid liability if it establishes
that the discharge or substantial threat of discharge resulted from (1) an
act of God, an act of war, hostilities, civil war, or insurrection; or (2) was
solely caused by an act or omission of person(s) other than the responsible
party, its employees, or agents. 148
H.R. 1632 also creates the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, as found in
section 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which is available for
the payment of removal costs and damages not otherwise compensated
under the Act. 149 This Fund would replace all separate funds currently
existing under the various federal statutes. 150
Initially the Trust Fund will receive financing from the amounts re-
maining in the Deepwater Port Liability Fund and the Offshore Oil Pol-
lution Compensation Fund. 151 Additional financing will come from a 1.3
cents-per-barrel-of-oil tax to be imposed against the importer, exporter,
or refinery operator of oil covered by the statute. 152
Section 302 provides that upon ratification and entry into force of the
1984 Protocols to the CLC and the Fund, the House bill will no longer
apply with respect to the liability of a shipowner for oil pollution dam-
ages. 153 Thus, once ratified, the Protocols would apply, as long as both
145. Id. § 102(c)(l)(A)-(C).
146. Id. § 107.
147. Id. § 102(c)(2). The limits are also vitiated if the discharge of oil was proximately
caused by a violation, within the privity or knowledge of the responsible party, of applicable
federal safety, construction, or operating regulations. Id.
148. Id. § 102(b)(l).
149. Id. §§ 101(a), 103.
150. Under the bill, any amounts remaining in the revolving fund established by the
FWPCA would be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury. Id. § 203(5). Any amounts
remaining in the TAPPA fund are to be refunded, on a pro rata basis, to the contributors.
Id. § 201(c).
151. Id. § 203(5).
152. Authority for this levy is contained in the Budget Reconciliation Bill, H.R. 5300,
passed by Congress last term.
153. H.R. 1632, suipra note 141, § 302.
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remained in force, to damages compensable under the Conventions. The
Trust Fund established under the House bill would be made available for
payments of contributions to the Fund Protocol. 154 The bill also provides
that the maximum amount that may be paid from the Trust Fund with
respect to any single incident in combination with payment, if any, under
the Fund Protocol, shall not exceed $500 million. 15 5 The current House
bill therefore appears to contemplate retention of the Trust Fund to sup-
plement the total amount of up to $270.5 million available under the CLC
and Fund Protocols.
The House bill also takes a compromise position with respect to the
effect the Act and eventual ratification of the Protocols would have on
existing state legislation. Although the Act would preempt state statutes
imposing additional or different liability requirements, section 109 states
that nothing in the Act "shall affect the authority of any State to establish
or continue in effect, and to require any person to contribute to a fund,
a purpose of which is to pay for removal costs or damages arising from"
oil spill pollution. 156
The bill also provides a system for implementation of the CLC and
Fund Protocols upon ratification of the Conventions by the Senate. Ap-
proved in May by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, H.R.
1632 is currently being considered by the Public Works and Transportation
Committee, which has concurrent jurisdiction.
As of this writing, the Senate has yet to introduce its own oil pollution
bill nor has it acted, except in committee, on ratification of the Protocols
which were submitted for advice and consent to ratification by President
Reagan in 1985.157 Oil pollution legislation was approved by both the
House and the Senate during the 99th Congress, but failed to become law
when an agreement could not be worked out on differences in the two
bills during the final days of the Second Session. 15 8 H.R. 1632 is seen as
a compromise between the two pollution bills passed last term. Retention
of separate state funds, as provided for in the current House legislation,
was one of the main points of contention between the Senate and House
bills last term. Thus, the proposed legislation that emerges from the Senate
this term could be similar to the current House bill.*
154. Id. § 103(a)(5).
155. Id. § 103(c).
156. Id. § 109(b). The Act also allows states to continue to impose civil penalties. id.
§ 109 (c).
157. Letter of Transinittal. supra note 48.
158. Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1986, H.R. 1232, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1986); Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1986, S. 2799, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986).
*Editor's Note: Since this article went to press Congress has taken a number of actions
that bear note. H.R. 1632 was never reported out of the House Public Works and Trans-
portation Committee after the emergence of substantial opposition to its proposed partial
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VI. Conclusion
Presently, a fragmented collection of state and federal laws provides
inadequate clean-up and damage remedies. In addition, the 1851 Limi-
tation of Liability Act represents a potentially devastating bar to recovery
of oil pollution damages. A judicial interpretation of the 1851 Act in favor
of full recovery is not guaranteed. In any case, judicial legislating should
not be allowed to replace decisive action by Congress.
The regime established by the CLC and Fund Protocols offers a com-
prehensive alternative. It is much too early to predict the fate of the CLC
and Fund Protocols in the United States; however, opponents are mar-
shalling their forces. Predictably, members of the oil and shipping indus-
tries find fault with the increased limits and the allocation of the
compensation responsibility. The oil industry, which favors a purely do-
mestic approach to liability for oil pollution damages, argues that the Fund
Protocol would unduly increase costs to consumers.
Supporters of the CLC and Fund protocols argue that the benefits of
ratification far outweigh the costs. The compensation available under the
Protocols, up to $270.5 million, is sufficient to compensate for all damages
caused by any oil spill likely to occur in the waters off the coasts of the
United States. 159 In addition, the Protocols contain a method of amend-
ment, by which the CLC liability limits as well as the Fund can be in-
creased. 160 Any lingering concerns about the amount of recovery available
under the Protocols can be addressed by maintaining supplemental funds
under state and federal law as contemplated by the current House bill. 16 1
These supplemental funds can be maintained in a manner consistent with
the Protocols' exclusivity requirements.
preemption of state oil pollution laws. An attempt to bypass opposition to the bill by attaching
the text of the legislation to the Budget Reconciliation Bill failed when the Senate deleted
the addendum. Finally, the Senate introduced its own bill, S. 1802, which is identical to
H.R. 1632. No timetable for consideration of the legislation by the Senate Environment and
Public Works had been set at the time of this article.
159. The estimated contribution of the United States to the Fund Protocol is approxi-
mately 7 million dollars, a reasonable premium for the amount of coverage the convention
would extend to United States coastal interests.
160. CLC Protocol, supra note 32, art. XV; Fund Protocol, supra note 32, art. XXXIII.
161. Additional sources of compensation may also remain available through the private
oil and tanker industries agreements, TOVALOP (Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution) and CRISTAL (Contract Regarding an Interim Sup-
plement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution). TOVALOP. which includes approximately
97% of the world's tankers of 6,000 gross tons or more, was organized in 1969 and currently
provides for compensation up to 70 million for any single incident of oil pollution damage.
CRISTAL, whose membership currently encompasses 766 companies whose oil cargos
comprise 80-90% of the world total, provides supplemental coverage above TOVALOP'S
$70 million ceiling. It is unclear whether the member industries will maintain these agree-
ments if comprehensive legislation is enacted. See J. Comm., May 22. 1987; TOVALOP is
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 497 (1969). CRISTAL is reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 137 (1971).
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The international community also stands to benefit from adoption of a
uniform and adequate system of liability and recovery for oil production
damages. The current international regime is clearly not working. Forum
shopping necessitated by woefully inadequate liability limits undermines
the purposes and goals of international maritime cooperation. United States
leadership in this area is warranted. Other countries made concessions
during the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Protocols in the
expectation and anticipation that the United States would become a part
of the international regime. 162 In fact, ratification by the United States is
expected to precipitate similar action on the part of other governments
currently waiting for action by the United States. 163 Finally, ratification
of the CLC and Fund Protocols may also offer the United States a more
intangible benefit: the opportunity to regain its credibility in the inter-
national maritime arena.
162. For example, various U.S. officials, including former Secretary of the Department
of Transportation, Elizabeth Hanford Dole, publicly endorsed the Protocols at the May
1984 diplomatic conference in London convened to consider the Protocols. Excerpts from
these statements are set out in Paulsen, Why the United States Should Ratify the 1984
Protocols to the International Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969)
and the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
(1971), 20 THE FORUM 164, 169-71 (1984).
163. As of this writing, there are thirteen signatories to the CLC Protocol. One country
(South Africa) has ratified. Twelve countries have signed the Fund Proposal. None have
ratified.




The following countries have ratified the 1969 International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage:
Table 2
The following states have ratified the 1971 International Convention on the Es-
tablishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage:
Algeria France Oman Syria
Bahamas Gabon Papua Tunisia
Benin GFR Poland Tuvalu
Camaroon Ghana Portugal UAE
Denmark Monaco Sri Lanka UK
Fiji Netherlands Spain Yugoslavia
Finland Norway Sweden
Source: Multilateral Treaties: Index and Current Status: United States State Department,
Office on Treaties.
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France
Gabon
GDR
GFR
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Iceland
Indonesia
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Korea (South)
Kuwait
AlgeriaAustralia
Bahamas
Belgium
Benin
Brazil
Chile
China
Denmark
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Fiji
Finland
Lebanon
Liberia
Maldives
Monaco
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Panama
Papua
Poland
Portugal
SenegalSingapore
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Syria
Tunisia
UAE
USSR
UK
Vanuatu
Yemen
Yugoslavia

